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Abstract
We propose a numerical accountant for evaluating the tight (ε, δ)-privacy loss for al-
gorithms with discrete one-dimensional output. The method is based on the privacy loss
distribution formalism and it is able to exploit the recently introduced Fast Fourier Trans-
form based accounting technique. We carry out a complete error analysis of the method in
terms of the moment bounds for the numerical estimate of the privacy loss distribution. We
demonstrate the performance on the binomial mechanism and show that our approach allows
decreasing noise variance up to an order of magnitude at equal privacy compared to existing
bounds in the literature. We also give a novel approach for evaluating (ε, δ)-upper bound
for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism. This completes the previously proposed analysis
by giving a strict upper bound for (ε, δ). We also illustrate how to compute tight bounds for
the exponential mechanism applied to counting queries.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [8] has been established as the standard approach for privacy-
preserving machine learning. As DP algorithms have grown increasingly complex, accurately
bounding the compound privacy loss has become more challenging as well. The moments
accountant [1] represented a major breakthrough in the accuracy of bounding the privacy
loss in compositions of subsampled Gaussian mechanisms that are commonly used in DP
stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD). This has further been refined through the general
development of Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [14] as well as tighter RDP bounds for
subsampled mechanisms [3, 20, 22, 15]. RDP enables tight analysis of some algorithms such
as compositions of Gaussian mechanisms, but this may be difficult for other mechanisms.
Furthermore, conversion of RDP guarantees back to more commonly used (ε, δ)-guarantees
is lossy.
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In this work we focus on an alternative of directly computing the entire profile of (ε(δ), δ)
guarantees. This is based on the recently introduced privacy loss distribution (PLD) formal-
ism of [16] and directly extends the recent Fourier accountant [11] to more general types of
mechanisms including discrete mechanisms and discrete/continuous hybrids.
The need to consider discrete mechanisms for rigorous DP on finite-precision computers
was first pointed out by Mironov [13]. Agarwal et al. [2] implement a highly communication
efficient binomial mechanism cpSGD for large scale neural network training. cpSGD cannot
handle composition and can therefore only use data from a single user once. [2, 10] note the
need for a privacy accountant for the binomial mechanism an important open problem, which
we solve in this paper for the case where the gradients are replaced with a sign approximation.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we give the basic definitions
of DP and describe the discrete PLD formalism used for our accountant. In Section 4 we
describe the FFT-based algorithm and in Section 5 give an error bound used to obtain strict
(ε, δ)-bounds. Section 6 concludes with experiments illustrating the efficiency and accuracy
of the method.
Our contribution. Our main contributions are
• A framework for analysing the tight (ε, δ)-DP guarantees of discrete-valued mechanisms
• A complete error analysis of the method using moment bounds of the mechanism at
hand
• An accurate strict (ε, δ)-upper bound for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism
2 Differential Privacy
We first recall some basic definitions of DP [9]. We use the following notation. An input
data set containing N data points is denoted as X = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ XN , where xi ∈ X ,
1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Definition 1. We say two data sets X and Y are neighbours in remove/add relation if you
get one by removing/adding an element from/to to other and denote it with ∼R. We say X
and Y are neighbours in substitute relation if you get one by substituting one element in the
other. We denote this with ∼S.
Definition 2. Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Let ∼ define a neighbouring relation. Mechanism
M : XN → R is (ε, δ,∼)-DP if for every X ∼ Y and every measurable set E ⊂ R we have
that
Pr(M(X) ∈ E) ≤ eεPr(M(Y ) ∈ E) + δ.
When the relation is clear from context or irrelevant, we will abbreviate it as (ε, δ)-DP. We
callM tightly (ε, δ,∼)-DP, if there does not exist δ′ < δ such thatM is (ε, δ′,∼)-DP.
3 Privacy Loss Distribution
We first introduce the basic tool for obtaining tight privacy bounds: the privacy loss distri-
bution (PLD). The results in this section can be seen as continuous versions of their discrete
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counterparts given in [12] and [16]. Proofs for the results of this section are given in Appendix
A.
3.1 Privacy Loss Distribution
We consider discrete-valued one-dimensional mechanismsM which can be seen as mappings
from XN to the set of discrete-valued random variables. The generalised probability density
functions ofM(X) andM(Y ), denoted fX(t) and fY (t), respectively, are given by
fX(t) =
∑
i
aX,i · δ0(t− tX,i) and fY (t) =
∑
i
aY,i · δ0(t− tY,i), (3.1)
where aX,i, aY,i ≥ 0,
∑
i aX,i =
∑
i aY,i = 1, tX,i, tY,i ∈ R and δ0(·) denotes the Dirac delta
function. Equivalently, (3.1) means that P(M(X) = tX,i) = aX,i for all i, and similarly for
M(Y ). We define the privacy loss distribution as follows.
Definition 3. Let M : XN → R, R ⊂ R, be a discrete-valued randomised mechanism and
let fX(t) and fY (t) denote the generalised density functions of M(X) and M(Y ), respec-
tively, both being of the form (3.1). We define the privacy loss distribution ωX/Y as
ωX/Y (s) =
∑
tX,i=tY,j
aX,i · δ0(s− si), si = log
(
aX,i
aY,j
)
. (3.2)
Notice that this definition differs slightly from the one given in [16, Def. 4.2]: we do
not include the symbol ∞ in ω. Thus, if fX(t) and fY (t) do not have equal supports, then∫
R ωX/Y (s) ds < 1. This situation is included in Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 5, and the analysis
of Section 5 also applies then.
Evaluating tight (ε, δ)-bounds using the PLD formalism is essentially based on a result
given in Appendix A which states that the mechanismM is tightly (ε, δ)-DP with
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt
}
. (3.3)
This result holds for both continuous and discrete output mechanisms. For the discrete-
valued mechanisms, the result was originally given in [16, Lemmas 5 and 10]. If the PLD
distribution is defined as (3.2), then (3.3) directly gives the following representation for δ(ε).
Lemma 4. M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ(ε) = maxX∼Y {δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)}, where
δX/Y (ε) = δX/Y (∞) +
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)ωX/Y (s) ds,
δX/Y (∞) =
∑
{ti : P(M(X)=ti)>0, P(M(Y )=ti)=0}
P(M(X) = ti),
(3.4)
and similarly for δY/X(ε).
We remark that finding the distributionsM(X) andM(Y ) that give the maximum δ is
application specific and has to be carried out individually for each case, similarly as, e.g., in
the case of Rényi differential privacy [14] and concentrated differential privacy [5].
3
3.2 Example: The Randomised Response
To illustrate the formalism described above, consider the randomised response mechanism [21]
which is described as follows. Suppose F is a function F : X → {0, 1}. Define the ran-
domised mechanismM for input X ∈ X by
M(X) =
{
F (X), with probability p
1− F (X), with probability 1− p,
where 0 < p < 1. Let X ∼ Y and let F (X) = 1 and F (Y ) = 0. Since these are the only
possible outputs, X and Y also represent the worst case in Lemma 4 and give the tight δ(ε).
We see that the density functions ofM(X) andM(Y ) are given by
fX(t) = p · δ0(t− 1) + (1− p) · δ0(t) and fY (t) = (1− p) · δ0(t− 1) + p · δ0(t).
From (3.2) we see that
ωX/Y (s) = p · δ0(s− cp) + (1− p) · δ0(s+ cp), ωY/X(s) = p · δ0(s+ cp) + (1− p) · δ0(s− cp),
where cp = log p1−p . Assume
1
2 < p < 1. Then by Lemma 4 we see that
δ(ε) =
{
p (1− eε−cp), if ε ≤ cp
0, else.
As ε→− cp, we see that δ → 0 as expected [9].
3.3 Tight (ε, δ)-Bounds for Compositions
Suppose the generalised distributions fX and fY are of the form (3.1). We define the con-
volution
(fX ∗ fY )(t) =
∑
i,j
aX,i aY,j · δ0(t− tX,i − tY,j).
Theorem 5 shows that the tight (ε, δ)-bounds for compositions of non-adaptive mechanisms
are obtained using convolutions of PLDs (see also [16, Thm. 1]).
Theorem 5. Consider a k-fold non-adaptive composition of a mechanism M. The compo-
sition is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ given by δ(ε) = max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)}, where
δX/Y (ε) = 1−
(
1− δX/Y (∞)
)k
+
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s) (ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y ) (s) ds,
where δX/Y (∞) is as defined in (3.4) and ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y denotes the k-fold convolution of
the generalised distribution ωX/Y (an analogous expression holds for δY/X(ε)).
We remark that our approach also allows computing tight privacy bound of a composite
mechanismM1 ◦ . . . ◦Mk, where the PLDs of the mechanismsMi vary (Appendix A).
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3.4 Subsampling Amplification
The subsampling amplification can be analysed similarly as in [11] in the case of the Gaussian
mechanism. For example, considering the ∼R-neighbouring relation and using the Poisson
subsampling with subsampling ratio 0 < q < 1 leads to considering the pair of distributions
qfX + (1 − q)fY and fY , where the distribution fX corresponds to a subsample including
the data element where X and Y differ. Subsampling without and with replacement using
∼S-neighbouring relation can be analysed with mixture distributions analogously to [11].
4 Fourier Accountant for Discrete-Valued Mechanisms
We next describe the numerical method for computing tight DP guarantees for discrete one-
dimensional distributions using the PLD formalism. We first recall the following definition.
4.1 Discrete Fourier Transform
Suppose x =
[
x0, . . . , xn−1
]T
, w =
[
w0, . . . , wn−1
]T ∈ Rn. The discrete Fourier transform
F and its inverse F−1 are defined as [18]
(Fx)k =
∑n−1
j=0
xje
−i 2pikj/n, (F−1w)k = 1
n
∑n−1
j=0
wje
i 2pikj/n,
where i =
√−1. Evaluating Fx and F−1w naively takes O(n2) operations, however eval-
uation via the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [6] reduces the running time complexity to
O(n log n).
4.2 Grid Approximation
In order to harness DFT, we place the PLD on a grid Xn = {x0, . . . , xn−1}, n ∈ Z+, where
xi = −L+ i∆x, ∆x = 2L/n. (4.1)
Suppose the distribution ω of the PLD is of the form ω(s) =
∑n−1
i=0 ai · δ0(s − si), where
ai ≥ 0 and −L ≤ si ≤ L−∆x, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. We define the grid approximations
ωL(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
ai · δ0(s− sLi ), sLi = sup{x ∈ Xn : si ≥ x},
ωR(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
ai · δ0(s− sRi ), sRi = inf{x ∈ Xn : si ≤ x}.
(4.2)
We note that as si’s correspond to the logarithmic ratios of probabilities of individual events,
often a moderate L is sufficient for the condition −L ≤ si ≤ L − ∆x to hold for all i. In
Appendix B we also provide analysis for the case where this assumption does not hold. From
(B.2) we have:
Lemma 6. Let δ(ε) be given by the integral formula of Lemma 4 and let δL(ε) and δR(ε) be
determined analogously by ωL and ωR. Then for all ε > 0 :
δL(ε) ≤ δ(ε) ≤ δR(ε).
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Lemma B.1 directly generalises to convolutions. The following bounds for the moment
generating functions are needed in the error analysis.
Lemma 7. Let ω, ωR and ωL be defined as above and let 0 < λ < (∆x)−1. Then
E[eλω
L
] ≤ E[eλω], E[e−λωL ] ≤ 11−λ∆xE[e−λω] (4.3)
and
E[eλω
R
] ≤ 11−λ∆xE[eλω], E[e−λω
R
] ≤ E[e−λω]. (4.4)
4.3 Truncation of Convolutions and Periodisation
The FFT assumes that inputs are periodic over a finite range. In the following we describe
truncation of convolutions and periodisation of distribution functions to meet this assump-
tion. Suppose ω is defined such that
ω(s) =
∑
i
ai · δ0(s− si), (4.5)
where ai ≥ 0 and si = i∆x. The convolutions can then be written as
(ω ∗ ω)(s) =
∑
i,j
aiaj · δ0(s− si − sj) =
∑
i
(∑
j
ajai−j
)
· δ0(s− si)
Let L > 0. We truncate these convolutions such that
(ω ∗ ω)(s) ≈
∑
i
(∑
−L≤sj<L
ajai−j
)
· δ0(s− si) =: (ω ~ ω)(s).
Next, we periodise ω. We define ω˜ to be a 2L-periodic extension of ω such that
ω˜(s) =
∑
m∈Z
∑
i
ai · δ0(s− si −m · 2L).
We further approximate (ω ~ ω) ≈ (ω˜ ~ ω˜). In case the distribution ω is defined on an
equidistant grid, FFT can be used to evaluate ω˜ ~ ω˜ as follows:
Lemma 8. Let ω be of the form (B.6), such that n is even, L > 0, ∆x = 2L/n and
si = −L+ i∆x, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Define
a =
[
a0 . . . an−1
]T and D = [ 0 In/2In/2 0 ] ∈ Rn×n.
Then,
(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
bki · δ0(s− si), where bki =
[
DF−1(F(Da)k)]
i
,
and k denotes the elementwise power of vectors.
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4.4 Approximation of the δ(ε)-integral
Finally, using the truncated and periodised convolutions we approximate the integral formula
in Lemma 4 for the tight δ-value as
δ(ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds ≈
∫ L
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~ ω˜)(s) ds. (4.6)
We describe the method in the pseudocode of Algorithm 1. In the following section we give
an error bound for the approximation with respect to the parameter L.
Algorithm 1 Fourier Accountant Algorithm for Discrete-Valued Mechanisms
Input: distribution ω of the form (B.6), such that n is even and si = −L+ i∆x, 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1,
∆x = 2L/n, number of compositions k.
Set
a =
[
a0 . . . an−1
]T
, D =
[
0 In/2
In/2 0
]
.
Evaluate
bk =
[
DF−1(F(Da)k)] , `ε = min{` ∈ N : −L+ `∆x > ε}.
Evaluate the approximation:
δ(ε) ≈ 1− (1− δX/Y (∞))k +
∑n−1
`=`ε
(
1− eε−(−L+`∆x)) bk` .
5 Approximation Error
We next give a bound for the error induced by Algorithm. 1 which is determined by the
parameter L. The total error consists of (see Appendix C)
1. The tail integral
∫∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds.
2. The error arising from periodisation of ω and truncation of the convolutions.
We obtain bounds for these two error sources using the Chernoff bound [19]
P[X ≥ t] ≤ E[e
λX ]
eλt
which holds for any random variable X and all λ > 0. Suppose ωX/Y is of the form
ωX/Y (s) =
∑n−1
i=0
aX,i · δ0(s− si), si = log
(
aX,i
aY,i
)
, (5.1)
where aX,i, aY,i > 0. Then, the moment generating function of ωX/Y is given by
E[eλωX/Y ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
eλsω(s) ds =
∑n−1
i=0
eλsi · aX,i =
∑n−1
i=0
(
aX,i
aY,i
)λ
aX,i. (5.2)
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Remark 9. Suppose fX(t) =
∑
i aX,i · δ0(t − ti), fY (t) =
∑
i aX,i · δ0(t − ti) and ωX/Y
is of the form (5.1). Then, we have that E[eλωX/Y ] = λ ·Dλ+1(fX , fY ), where Dα denotes
the Rényi divergence of order α [14]. Further, defining α(λ) := log(E[eλωX/Y ]), we see that
α(λ) is exactly the logarithm of the moment generating function of the privacy loss function
as defined, e.g., in [1] and [15]. Thus existing Rényi differential privacy estimates for α(λ)
could be used to bound the moment generating function of ωX/Y .
5.1 Tail Bound
Denote Sk :=
∑k
i=1 ωi, where ωi denotes the PLD random variable of the ith mechanism.
If ωi’s are independent, we have that E[eλSk ] =
∏k
i=1 E[eλωi ]. Then, if ωi’s are i.i.d. and
distributed as ω, the Chernoff bound shows that for any λ > 0∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds = P[Sk ≥ L] ≤
∏k
i=1
E[eλωi ] e−λL ≤ ekα(λ)e−λL, (5.3)
where α(λ) = log(E[eλω]).
5.2 Total Error
We define α+(λ) and α−(λ) via the moment generating function of the PLD as α+(λ) =
log(E[eλω]) and α−(λ) = log(E[e−λω]). Using the analysis given in Appendix C, we bound
the errors arising from the periodisation of the distribution and truncation of the convolu-
tions. As a result, combining with (5.3), we obtain the following bound for the total error
incurred by Algorithm 1.
Theorem 10. Let ω be defined on the grid Xn as described above, let δ(ε) give the tight
(ε, δ)-bound for ω and let δ˜(ε) be the result of Algorithm 1. Then, for all λ > 0
∣∣∣δ(ε)− δ˜(ε)∣∣∣ ≤ (2e (k+1)α+(λ) − ekα+(λ) − eα+(λ)
eα+(λ) − 1 +
e (k+1)α
−(λ) − eα−(λ)
eα−(λ) − 1
)
e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ .
Given a PLD distribution ω, we approximate δL(ε) and δR(ε) (see Lemma B.1) using
Algorithm 1 and estimate the error incurred by the approximation using Thm. 10 and the
expressions given by Lemma B.3. By subtracting this error from the approximation of δL(ε)
and adding it to the approximation of δR(ε) we obtain strict lower and upper bounds for
δ(ε). We used in all experiments λ = L/2 and the moment generating functions are evaluated
using (E.7).
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6 Examples
6.1 The Exponential Mechanism
Consider the exponential mechanismM with quality score u : Xn ×Y → R and parameter
ε, i.e., an outcome y is sampled with probability P(M(X) = y) = eεu(X,y)∑
y e
εu(X,y) . Consider the
neighbouring relation ∼R. Let u be a counting query and Y = {0, 1}. Denote by m the
number of elements in X which have the property 0 (n−m elements have the property 1).
Let X ′ ∈ Xn−1, X ∼ X ′, be such that m − 1 elements have the property 0. Denote the
logarithmic ratio at y = 0 as
s0 := log
(
P(M(X) = 0)
P(M(X ′) = 0)
)
= log
(
eεm
eε(m−1)
eε(m−1) + eε(n−m)
eεm + eε(n−m)
)
and similarly for s1. Using the values of P(M(X) = i) and si, i = 0, 1, we obtain the
PLD. We set ε = 0.05 and m = 50. Figure 1 shows the δ(ε˜)-values for ε˜ = 1.0, when
computed using Algorithm 1 for M(X) and M(X ′) and the optimal bound [7, Thm. 2]
and the corresponding compute times. The evaluation of the expression in [7, Thm. 2] is
optimised using the logarithmic Gamma function.
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Alg.1 upper bound, m=50
Dong et al. Theorem 2
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Dong et al. Theorem 2
Figure 1: Left: Here ε = 0.1 and we compute δ(ε˜) for ε˜ = 1.0. Right: Compute times for
different number of compositions k. δ(ε˜) is computed for for ε˜ = 1.0.
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6.2 The Binomial Mechanism
The binomial mechanism [2] adds binomially distributed zero centered noise to the output
of a query f with output space Zd asM(D) = f(D) + (Z − np) · s, where n ∈ N, 0 < p < 1,
s = 1/j for some j ∈ N and where for each coordinate i, Zi ∼ Bin(n, p) and indepedent. The
(ε, δ)-analysis of the mechanism can be carried out via one dimensional distributions using
the following result (the proof given in Appendix D).
Theorem 11. Consider a function f : XN → Rd and a randomised mechanism M(X) of
the form M(X) = f(X) + Z, where Zi’s are independent random variables. Consider data
sets X and Y , and denote ∆ = f(X) − f(Y ). Then, the tight (ε, δ)-bound for M(X) and
M(Y ) is given by the tight (ε, δ)-bound for the one dimensional random variables
‖∆‖22 +
∑
i
∆iZi and
∑
i
∆iZi.
Figure 2 illustrates how Alg. 1 gives tighter bounds than the bound given in [2, Thm. 1],
and also how the (ε, δ)-bound given by Alg. 1 is close to the tight bound of the Gaussian
mechanism for the corresponding variance (Analytical Gaussian mechanism [4]). We set
∆ =
[
1
10 , . . . ,
1
10
] ∈ R100 and thus this example is analogous to the one used in [2, Fig. 1].
Figure 2 shows results for MNIST classification task, where we use a three-layer feed-
forward network with ReLUs and a hidden layer of width 60. To have a practical example
where Theorem D.1 applies, DP-SGD approximation of the gradients is carried out such that
for each per example gradient we use a sign approximation, where 200 largest elements (by
magnitude) of the input layer are approximated by their sign and rest are set to zero, and
similarly 20 largest of the hidden layer and the largest one of the output layer. Elementwise
zero centered binomial noise with parameters n and p = 12 is then added to the averaged
gradients. By Thm. D.1 and subsampling amplification (Sec. 3.4), the (ε, δ)-bound can be
obtained by running Alg. 1 for the PLD determined by the distributions qfX + (1 − q)fY
and fY , where fX is the density function of 221 + Bin(221n, p), fY the density function of
Bin(221n, p) and q denotes the subsampling ratio, i.e., q = |B| /M , where |B| is the mini-
batch size and M the total size of the training data. The results are averages of 5 runs. We
compare this method to cpSGD [2] applied to Infinite MNIST data set which has the same
test data set as MNIST. The results for cpSGD are extracted from [2, Fig. 2]. For ε = 2.0
we extract the result where each element of the gradient requires 8 bits and for ε = 4.0 the
one requiring 16 bits. We note that when n = 3000 our method requires 12 bits per element.
We set the learning rate initially η = 0.02. When n = 2400 and batch size |B| = 500,
starting from epoch 13, and when n = 3000 and |B| = 300, starting from epoch 5, the
learning rate η is linearly decreased after each epoch such that it is zero at the end of the
training. In all experiments we use p = 12 .
10
5 10 15 20 25 30
Noise std - = s np(1 p)
10 1
100
pr
iv
ac
y-
cpSGD bound, s = 1.0
cpSGD bound, s = 0.5
cpSGD bound, s = 0.1
Alg.1, s = 1.0
Alg.1, s = 0.1
Analytical Gaussian Mechanism [4]
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
privacy-
65
70
75
80
85
Te
st
 a
cc
ur
ac
y
Alg.1 (MNIST), |B| = 300, n = 3000, = 10 6
Alg.1 (MNIST), |B| = 300, n = 3000, = 10 9
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cpSGD (Infinite MNIST), = 10 9
Figure 2: Left: Comparison of the cpSGD bound [2, Thm. 1] and the upper bound given by
Alg. 1 (δ = 10−4). The bound given by Alg. 1 is close to that of the Analytical Gaussian
mechanism [4].
Right: A small feedforward model run on MNIST (M = 6 ·104) using Alg. 1 and on Inf. MNIST
(M = 2.5 · 108) using cpSGD [2]. Alg. 1 takes into account the subsampling amplification
(Sec. 3.4).
6.3 The Subsampled Gaussian Mechanism
We next show how to compute rigorous bounds for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism
using the method presented here. We consider the Poisson subsampling and ∼R-neighbouring
relation. For a subsampling ratio q and noise level σ, the continuous PLD is given by [11]
ω(s) =
{
f(g(s))g′(s), if s > log(1− q),
0, otherwise,
where
f(t) =
1√
2piσ2
[qe
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q)e− t
2
2σ2 ] and g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
.
Let L > 0, n ∈ Z+, ∆x = 2L/n and si = −L+ i∆x for all i ∈ Z. Define
ωmin(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
c−i · δ0(s− si), c−i = ∆x ·mins∈[si,si+1] ω(s),
ωmax(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
c+i · δ0(s− si), c+i = ∆x ·maxs∈[si−1,si] ω(s).
(6.1)
Let ε > 0 and denote the tight privacy bound of the subsampled Gaussian mechanism by
δ(ε). By deriving bounds for the moment generating functions of the infinitely extending
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counterparts of ωmin and ωmax (Appendix E) and by using Algorithm 1 and Theorem 10 we
obtain numerical values δmin(ε) and δmax(ε) (depending on n and L) such that
δmin(ε) ≤ δ(ε) ≤ δmax(ε). (6.2)
Figure 3 illustrates the convergence of the bound (6.2) as n grows and L is fixed. For
comparison, we also show the numerical values given by Tensorflow moments accountant [1].
200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Number of compositions
10 10
10 9
10 8
10 7
10 6
10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
(
)
max( ), n =  3 105, t=0.09 sec
min( ), n =  3 105
max( ), n =  1 106, t=0.31 sec
min( ), n =  1 106
max( ), n =  1 107, t=3.88 sec
min( ), n =  1 107
Tensorflow MA, t=0.02 sec
Figure 3: The subsampled Gaussian mechanism and bounds for δ(ε), when ε = 1.0, q = 0.02,
σ = 2.0 and L = 8.0. Here n denotes the number of discretisation points. Compute times are
for each curve.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a novel approach for computing privacy bounds for discrete valued mech-
anisms. The method provides tools for moments accountant - like techniques for evaluating
privacy bounds for discrete output DP-SGD algorithms. Moreover, as the example of Sec-
tion 6.3 shows, accurate (ε, δ)-bounds for continuous mechanisms can also be obtained using
the proposed method. Due to the rigorous error analysis the reported (ε, δ)-values are strict
privacy bounds.
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A Proofs for the Results of Section 3
A.1 Integral Representation for Exact DP-Guarantees
Throughout this section we denote for neighbouring datasets X and Y the density func-
tion of M(X) with fX(t) and the density function of M(Y ) with fY (t). The definition of
approximate differential privacy is equivalently given as follows.
Definition A.1. A randomised algorithmM with an output of one dimensional distributions
satisfies (ε, δ)-DP if for every set S ⊂ R and every neighbouring datasets X and Y∫
S
fX(t) dt ≤ eε
∫
S
fY (t) dt+ δ and
∫
S
fY (t) dt ≤ eε
∫
S
fX(t) dt+ δ.
We callM tightly (ε, δ)-DP, if there does not exist δ′ < δ such thatM is (ε, δ′)-DP.
The auxiliary lemma A.2 is needed for Lemma 4. For discrete valued distributions, it
is originally given in [12, Lemma 1]. In the proof below, if fX and fY are discrete valued
distributions and if
fX(t)− eεfY (t) =
∑
i
ci · δ(t− ti)
for some coefficients ci, ti ∈ R, then max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} denotes
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} =
∑
i
max{ci, 0} · δ(t− ti),
and the set S denotes
S = {t ∈ R : fY (t) ≥ eεfX(t)} = R \ {ti : ci < 0}.
Lemma A.2. M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP with
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt
}
. (A.1)
Proof. AssumeM is tightly (ε, δ)-DP. Then, for every set S ⊂ R and for all X ∼ Y :∫
S
fX(t)− eεfY (t) dt ≤
∫
S
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt ≤
∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt.
We get an analogous bound for
∫
S
fY (t) − eεfX(t) dt. Since M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP, by
Definition A.1,
δ ≤ max
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt
}
.
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To show that the above inequality is tight, consider the set
S = {t ∈ R : fX(t) ≥ eεfY (t)}.
Then, ∫
S
fX(t)− eεfY (t) dt =
∫
S
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt
=
∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt.
(A.2)
Next, consider the set S = {t ∈ R : fY (t) ≥ eεfX(t)}. Similarly,∫
S
fY (t)− eεfX(t) dt =
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt. (A.3)
From (A.2) and (A.3) it follows that there exists a set S ⊂ R such that either∫
S
fX(t) dt = e
ε
∫
S
fY (t) dt+ δ or
∫
S
fY (t) dt = e
ε
∫
S
fX(t) dt+ δ
for δ given by (A.1). This shows that δ given by (A.1) is tight.
Recall from the main text that if fX and fY are of the form (3.1), then the PLD distri-
bution function is given by
ωX/Y (s) =
∑
tX,i=tY,j
aX,i · δ(s− si), si = log
(
aX,i
aY,j
)
. (A.4)
The following lemma gives an integral representation for the tight δ(ε)-bound involving the
distribution function of the PLD. For discrete valued distributions, it is originally given
in [16, Lemma 5].
Lemma A.3. LetM be defined as above. M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)},
where
δX/Y (ε) = δX/Y (∞) +
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ωX/Y (s) ds,
δY/X(ε) = δY/X(∞) +
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ωY/X(s) ds,
δX/Y (∞) =
∑
{ti : P(M(X)=ti)>0, P(M(Y )=ti)=0}
aX,i,
δY/X(∞) =
∑
{ti : P(M(Y )=ti)>0, P(M(X)=ti)=0}
aY,i.
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Proof. We directly find from the definition of fX and fY and from the definition (A.4) that
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} =
∑
{ti : P(M(X)=ti)>0, P(M(Y )=ti)=0}
aX,i · δ(t− tX,i)
+
∑
tX,i=tY,j
max{aX,i − eεaY,j , 0} · δ(t− tX,i)
=
∑
{ti : P(M(X)=ti)>0, P(M(Y )=ti)=0}
aX,i · δ(t− tX,i)
+
∑
tX,i=tY,j
aX,i max{(1− eε−si), 0} · δ(t− tX,i),
and therefore∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt = δX/Y (∞) +
∑
tX,i=tY,j
aX,i max{(1− eε−si), 0}
= δX/Y (∞) +
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ωX/Y (s) ds.
Analogously, we see that∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt = δY/X(∞) +
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ωY/X(s) ds.
The claim follows then from Lemma A.2.
A.2 Privacy Loss Distribution of Compositions
The following theorem shows that the PLD distribution of discrete non-adaptive compositions
is obtained using convolution. We first recall the definition of convolution of two generalised
functions as defined in the main text. Suppose the distributions fX and fY are of the form
(1). We define the convolution fX ∗ fY as
(fX ∗ fY )(t) =
∑
i,j
aX,i aY,j · δ(t− tX,i − tY,j). (A.5)
The result of the following theorem is originally given in [16, Thm. 1]. For completeness we
give a proof using our notation.
Theorem A.4. Let fX(t), fY (t), fX′(t) and fY ′(t) denote the density functions ofM(X),
M(Y ), M′(X) and M′(Y ), respectively. Denote by ωX/Y the PLD distribution of M(X)
overM(Y ) and by ωX′/Y ′ the PLD distribution ofM′(X) overM′(Y ). Denote by ω˜X/Y the
PLD of the non-adaptive compositionM◦M′ = (M,M′). The density function of ω˜X/Y is
given by
ω˜X/Y = ωX/Y ∗ ωX′/Y ′ .
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Moreover,
δ˜X/Y (∞) : = P((M◦M′)(X) > 0, (M◦M′)(Y ) = 0)
= 1− (1− δX/Y (∞))(1− δ′X/Y (∞)),
where
δX/Y (∞) = P(M(X) > 0,M(Y ) = 0), δ′X/Y (∞) = P(M′(X) > 0,M′(Y ) = 0).
Proof. By definition of the privacy loss distribution,
ω˜X/Y (s) =
∑
(ti,t′i)=(tj ,t
′
j)
P
(
(M◦M′)(X) = (ti, t′i)
) · δ(s− s˜i),
s˜i = log
(
(M◦M′)(X) = (ti, t′i)
(M◦M′)(Y ) = (tj , t′j)
)
.
Due to the independence ofM andM′,
P
(M(X) = ti,M′(X) = t′i) = P(M(X) = ti)P(M′(X) = t′i),
P
(M(Y ) = tj ,M′(Y ) = t′j) = P(M(Y ) = tj)P(M′(Y ) = t′j). (A.6)
Therefore,
log
(
P
(M(X) = ti,M′(X) = t′i)
P
(M(Y ) = tj ,M′(Y ) = t′j)
)
= log
(
P
(M(X) = ti)
P
(M(Y ) = tj)
)
+ log
(
P
(M′(X) = t′i)
P
(M′(Y ) = t′j)
)
.
and
ω˜X/Y (s) =
∑
(ti,t′i)=(tj ,t
′
j)
P
(M(X) = ti)P(M′(X) = t′i) · δ(s− si − s′i), (A.7)
where
si = log
(
P
(M(X) = ti)
P
(M(Y ) = tj)
)
, s′i = log
(
P
(M′(X) = t′i)
P
(M′(Y ) = t′j)
)
.
We see from (A.7) that ω˜X/Y = ωX/Y ∗ ωX′/Y ′ with convolution as defined in (A.5). The
expression for δ˜X/Y (∞) follows directly from its definition and from the independence of the
mechanisms (A.6).
Theorem A.4 directly gives the following representation for tight δ(ε) of compositions.
Corollary A.5. Consider k consecutive applications of a mechanism M. Let ε > 0. The
composition is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ given by
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)},
where
δX/Y (ε) = 1− (1− δX/Y (∞))k +
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y ) (s) ds,
where (ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y )(s) denotes the density function obtained by convolving ωX/Y by itself
k times (an analogous formula holds for δY/X(ε)).
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B Proofs for the Results of Section 4
B.1 Grid Approximation
Recall from Section 4 of the main text: we place the PLD distribution on a grid Xn =
{x0, . . . , xn−1}, n ∈ Z+, where
xi = −L+ i∆x, ∆x = 2L/n. (B.1)
Suppose the distribution ω of the PLD is of the form ω(s) =
∑n−1
i=0 ai · δ0(s − si), where
ai ≥ 0 and −L ≤ si ≤ L−∆x, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. We define the grid approximations
ωL(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
ai · δ0(s− sLi ), sLi = sup{x ∈ Xn : si ≥ x},
ωR(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
ai · δ0(s− sRi ), sRi = inf{x ∈ Xn : si ≤ x}.
(B.2)
Lemma B.1. Let δ(ε) be given by the integral formula of Lemma 4 and let δL(ε) and δR(ε)
be defined analogously by ωL and ωR. Then for all ε > 0 we have
δL(ε) ≤ δ(ε) ≤ δR(ε). (B.3)
Proof. The claim follows from the definition (B.2) and from the fact that (1 − eε−s) is a
monotonously increasing function of s.
Corollary B.2. Lemma B.1 directly generalises to convolutions. Namely, if
(ω ∗k ω)(s) =
∑
i
ai · δ(s− si)
for some coefficients ai ≥ 0, si ∈ R, then from the definition (A.5) it follows that
(ωL ∗k ωL)(s) =
∑
i
ai · δ(s− sLi )
for some sLi such that sLi ≤ si for all i. And similarly, then
(ωR ∗k ωR)(s) =
∑
i
ai · δ(s− sRi )
for some sRi such that sRi ≥ si for all i. And since (1− eε−s) is a monotonously increasing
function of s for s ≥ ε, the inequality (B.3) holds also in case δ(ε), δL(ε) and δR(ε) is
determined by ω ∗k ω, ωL ∗k ωL and ωR ∗k ωR, respectively.
The following bounds for the moment generating functions are needed in the error anal-
ysis.
Lemma B.3. Let ω, ωR and ωL be defined as above and let 0 < λ < (∆x)−1. Then
E[eλω
L
] ≤ E[eλω], E[e−λωL ] ≤ 11−λ∆xE[e−λω] (B.4)
and
E[eλω
R
] ≤ 11−λ∆xE[eλω], E[e−λω
R
] ≤ E[e−λω]. (B.5)
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Proof. The condition E[eλωL ] ≤ E[eλω] follows directly from the definition (B.2):
E[eλω
L
] =
∑n−1
i=0
aie
λsLi ≤
∑n−1
i=0
aie
λsi = E[eλω],
since sLi ≤ si for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. The proof for the condition E[e−λω
R
] ≤ E[e−λω] goes
similarly.
Using the Lipschitz continuity of the exponential function, we see that
E[eλω
R
]− E[eλω] =
∑n−1
i=0
ai
(
eλs
R
i − eλsi)
≤
∑n−1
i=0
aiλ
∣∣sRi − si∣∣ eλsRi
≤ λ∆x
∑n−1
i=0
aie
λsRi = λ∆xE[eλω
R
].
Thus
(1− λ∆x)E[eλωR ] ≤ E[eλω]
from which the condition E[eλωR ] ≤ 11−λ∆x E[eλω] follows. The proof for the condition
E[e−λωL ] ≤ 11−λ∆x E[e−λω] goes similarly.
B.2 FFT Evaluation for Truncated Convolutions of Periodic Distri-
butions
We next prove the lemma showing that the truncated convolutions of periodic distributions
can be evaluated using FFT. Suppose ω is defined on Xn such that
ω(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
ai · δ(s− si), (B.6)
where ai ≥ 0 and si = i∆x. The convolutions can then be written as
(ω ∗ ω)(s) =
∑
i,j
aiaj · δ(s− si − sj) =
∑
i
(∑
j
ajai−j
)
· δ(s− si).
We define ω˜ to be a 2L-periodic extension of ω such that
ω˜(s) =
∑
m∈Z
∑
i
ai · δ(s− si −m · 2L).
In case the distribution ω is defined on an equidistant grid, FFT can be used to evaluate the
approximation ω˜ ~ ω˜:
Lemma B.4. Let ω be of the form (B.6), such that n is even and si = −L+ i∆x, 0 ≤ i ≤
n− 1. Define
a =
[
a0 . . . an−1
]T and D = [ 0 In/2In/2 0 ] ∈ Rn×n.
Then,
(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
bki · δ(s− si),
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where
bki =
[
DF−1(F(Da)k)]
i
,
and k denotes the elementwise power of vectors.
Proof. Assume n is even and si = −L + i∆x, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. From the the truncation and
periodisation it follows that ω˜ ~ ω˜ is of the form
(ω˜ ~ ω˜)(s) =
∑n−1
i=0
bi · δ(s− si), bi =
∑3n/2−1
j=n/2
aj ai−j (indices modulo n). (B.7)
Denoting a˜ = Da, we see that the coefficients bi in (B.7) are given by the expression
bi+n/2 =
∑n−1
j=0
a˜j a˜i−j (indices modulo n),
to which we can apply DFT and the convolution theorem [17]. I.e., when 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
bi+n/2 =
[F−1(F(a˜)F(a˜))]
i
=
[F−1(F(Da)F(Da))]
i
, (indices modulo n) (B.8)
where  denotes the elementwise product of vectors. From (B.8) we find that
bi =
[
DF−1(F(Da)F(Da))]
i
, (indices modulo n).
By induction this generalises to k-fold compositions and we arrive at the claim.
C Proofs for the Results of Section 5
We next prove step by step the main theorem, i.e., Theorem 10 of the main text. We start
by splitting the error induced by Algorithm 1 into three terms.
Lemma C.1. Let ω be a generalised distribution and denote by δ˜(ε) the result of Algorithm
1. Total error of the approximation can be split as follows:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds− δ˜(ε)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ I1(L) + I2(L) + I3(L),
where
I1(L) =
∞∫
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds,
I2(L) =
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(s) ds,
I3(L) =
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s)∣∣ ds.
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Proof. By adding and subtracting terms and using the triangle inequality, we get∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds− δ˜(ε)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(C.1)
Since 0 ≤ (1 − eε−s) < 1 for all s ≥ ε, we have for the first term on the right hand side of
(C.1):∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∞∫
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds. (C.2)
Similarly, adding and subtracting
∫ L
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ~k ω)(s) ds the second term on the right
hand side of (C.1), we find that∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ I2(L) + I3(L)
which shows the claim.
We consider next separately each of the three terms stated in Theorem C.1. Each of
them are bounded using the Chernoff bound [19]
P[X ≥ t] = P[eλX ≥ eλt] ≤ E[e
λX ]
eλt
,
which holds for any random variable X and all λ > 0. If ω is of the form
ω(s) =
n−1∑
i=0
ai · δ(s− si), si = log
(
aX,i
aY,i
)
,
where aX,i, aY,i ≥ 0, si ∈ R, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, the moment generating function is given by
E[eλωX/Y ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
eλsω(s) ds =
n∑
i=1
eλsi · aX,i =
n∑
i=1
(
aX,i
aY,i
)λ
aX,i. (C.3)
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C.1 Tail Bound for the Convolved PLDs
Denote Sk :=
∑k
i=1 ωi, where ωi denotes the PLD random variable of the ith mechanism.
Since ωi’s are independent, E[eλSk ] =
∏k
i=1 E[eλωi ] and the Chernoff bound shows that for
any λ > 0 ∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds = P[Sk ≥ L] ≤
k∏
i=1
E[eλωi ] e−λL.
If ωi’s are i.i.d. and distributed as ω, and if α(λ) = log(E[eλω]), then
I1(L) =
∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds ≤ ekα(λ)e−λL. (C.4)
C.2 Error Arising from the Periodisation
We define α+(λ) and α−(λ) via the moment generating function of the PLD as
α+(λ) = log(E[eλω]) and α−(λ) = log(E[e−λω]). (C.5)
Using the Chernoff bound, the required error bounds can be obtained using α+(λ) and α−(λ).
Lemma C.2. Let ω be defined as above and suppose si ∈ [−L,L] for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
Then,
I3(L) =
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s)∣∣ ds ≤ (ekα+(λ) + ekα−(λ)) e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ .
Proof. Let ω and the 2L-periodic continuation ω˜(s) be of the form
ω(s) =
∑
i
ai · δ(s− si) and ω˜(s) =
∑
i
a˜i · δ(s− si)
for some ai, a˜i ≥ 0, si = i∆x. By definition,
(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) =
∑
−L≤sj1<L
a˜j1
∑
−L≤sj2<L
a˜j2 . . .
∑
−L≤sjk−1<L
a˜jk−1
∑
i
a˜i−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si)
=
∑
−L≤sj1<L
aj1
∑
−L≤sj2<L
aj2 . . .
∑
−L≤sjk−1<L
ajk−1
∑
i
a˜i−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si)
=
∑
j1
aj1
∑
j2
aj2 . . .
∑
jk−1
ajk−1
∑
i
a˜i−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si)
and
(ω ~k ω)(s) =
∑
−L≤sj1<L
aj1
∑
−L≤sj2<L
aj2 . . .
∑
−L≤sjk−1<L
ajk−1
∑
i
ai−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si)
=
∑
j1
aj1
∑
j2
aj2 . . .
∑
jk−1
ajk−1
∑
i
ai−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si).
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Thus
(ω˜ ~k ω˜ − ω ~k ω)(s)
=
∑
j1
aj1
∑
j2
aj2 . . .
∑
jk−1
ajk−1
∑
i
âi−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si), (C.6)
where
âi =
{
0, if − L ≤ si < L,
aimodn, else.
(C.7)
From (C.6) we see that
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s)∣∣ ds ≤ ∫
R
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s)∣∣ ds
=
∫
R
∑
j1
aj1
∑
j2
aj2 . . .
∑
jk−1
ajk−1
∑
i
âi−j1−...−jk−1 · δ(s− si) ds
=
∑
j1
aj1
∑
j2
aj2 . . .
∑
jk−1
ajk−1
∑
i
âi−j1−...−jk−1 .
(C.8)
From (C.7) we see that∑
j1
aj1
∑
j2
aj2 . . .
∑
jk−1
ajk−1
∑
i
âi−j1−...−jk−1
=
∑
n∈Z\{0}
P
(
(2n− 1)L ≤ ω ∗k ω < (2n+ 1)L)
=
∑
n∈Z−
P
(
(2n− 1)L ≤ ω ∗k ω < (2n+ 1)L)
+
∑
n∈Z+
P
(
(2n− 1)L ≤ ω ∗k ω < (2n+ 1)L)
≤
∑
n∈Z−
P
(
ω ∗k ω ≤ (2n+ 1)L)+ ∑
n∈Z+
P
(
ω ∗k ω ≥ (2n− 1)L).
(C.9)
We also see that∑
n∈Z−
P
(
ω ∗k ω ≤ (2n+ 1)L) = ∑
n∈Z+
P
(
(−ω) ∗k (−ω) ≥ (2n− 1)L).
Using the bounds (C.8), (C.9) and the Chernoff bound (C.4), we find that for all λ > 0
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ∗k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s)∣∣ ds ≤ ∞∑
`=1
ekα
+(λ)e−`Lλ + ekα
−(λ)e−`Lλ
=
(
ekα
+(λ) + ekα
−(λ)) e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ .
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C.3 Error Arising from the Truncation of the Convolution Integrals
Next, assume that the generalised distribution ω of the PLD is of the form
ω(s) =
∑
i
ai · δ(s− si),
where ai ≥ 0 and si = i∆x.
The following lemma gives a bound for the truncation error
∫ L
ε
∣∣(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(s)∣∣ ds
in terms of the moment generating function of ω. Notice that this result applies also for the
case where the support of the PLD distribution are outside of the interval [−L,L].
Lemma C.3. Let ω be defined as above. For all λ > 0,
I2(L) =
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(s) ds ≤
(
ekα
+(λ) − eα+(λ)
eα+(λ) − 1 +
eα
−(λ) − ekα−(λ)
1− eα−(λ)
)
e−Lλ.
Proof. By adding and subtracting (ω ∗k ω)~ ω , we may write
ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω = (ω ∗k−1 ω) ∗ ω − (ω ∗k−1 ω)~ ω + (ω ∗k−1 ω − ω ~k−1 ω)~ ω. (C.10)
Let ` ∈ Z+. Let ω be of the form ω(s) = ∑i ai · δ(s− si) and let the convolution ω ∗` ω be
of the form (ω ∗` ω)(s) = ∑i ci · δ(s− si) for some ai, ci ≥ 0, si = i∆x. From the definition
of the operators ∗ and ~ it follows that(
(ω ∗` ω) ∗ ω − (ω ∗` ω)~ ω)(s)
=
∑
i
(∑
j
cjai−j
)
· δ(s− si)−
∑
i
( ∑
−L≤sj<L
cjai−j
)
· δ(s− si)
=
∑
i
( ∑
sj<−L, sj≥L
cjai−j
)
· δ(s− si).
Therefore∫
R
(
(ω ∗` ω) ∗ ω − (ω ∗` ω)~ ω)(s) ds =∫
R
∑
i
( ∑
sj<−L, sj≥L
cjai−j
)
· δ(s− si) ds
=
∑
sj<−L, sj≥L
cj
∫
R
∑
i
ai−j · δ(s− si) ds
=
∑
sj<−L, sj≥L
cj
=P
(
ω ∗` ω < −L
)
+ P
(
ω ∗` ω ≥ L
)
≤ e`α+(λ)e−Lλ + e`α−(λ)e−Lλ
(C.11)
for all λ > 0. The last inequality follows from the Chernoff bound. Similarly, let ω∗`ω−ω~`ω
be of the form
(ω ∗` ω − ω ~` ω)(s) =
∑
i
c˜i · δ(s− si)
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for some c˜i ≥ 0, si = i∆x. Then∫
R
(
(ω ∗` ω − ω ~` ω)~ ω)(s) ds =∫
R
∑
i
( ∑
−L≤sj<L
c˜jai−j
)
· δ(s− si) ds
=
∑
−L≤sj<L
c˜j
∫
R
∑
i
ai−j · δ(s− si) ds
≤
∑
−L≤sj<L
c˜j
≤
∫
R
(ω ∗` ω − ω ~` ω)(s) ds.
(C.12)
Using (C.10), (C.11) and (C.12), we see that for all λ > 0,
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(s) ds ≤
∫
R
(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(s) ds
≤ e (k−1)α+(λ)e−Lλ + e (k−1)α−(λ)e−Lλ
+
∫
R
(ω ∗k−1 ω − ω ~k−1 ω)(s) ds.
(C.13)
Using (C.13) recursively, we see that for all λ > 0,
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(s) ds ≤
k−1∑
`=1
e`α
+(λ)e−Lλ +
k−1∑
`=1
e`α
−(λ)e−Lλ
=
(
ekα
+(λ) − eα+(λ)
eα+(λ) − 1 +
ekα
−(λ) − eα−(λ)
eα−(λ) − 1
)
e−Lλ.
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C.4 Proof of Theorem 10 (Total Error)
Proof of Theorem 10. Let α+(λ) and α−(λ) be defined as in (C.5). Combining the bound
(C.4) and the bounds given by Lemmas C.2 and C.3, we find that∣∣∣δ(ε)− δ˜(ε)∣∣∣
≤ ekα+(λ)e−λL + (ekα+(λ) + ekα−(λ)) e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ +
(
ekα
+(λ) − eα+(λ)
eα+(λ) − 1 +
ekα
−(λ) − eα−(λ)
eα−(λ) − 1
)
e−Lλ
≤ ekα+(λ) e
−Lλ
1− e−Lλ +
(
ekα
+(λ) + ekα
−(λ)) e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ
+
(
ekα
+(λ) − eα+(λ)
eα+(λ) − 1 +
ekα
−(λ) − eα−(λ)
eα−(λ) − 1
)
e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ
=
(
2e (k+1)α
+(λ) − ekα+(λ) − eα+(λ)
eα+(λ) − 1 +
e (k+1)α
−(λ) − eα−(λ)
eα−(λ) − 1
)
e−Lλ
1− e−Lλ .
D A Proof for the Result of Section 6
D.1 Tight Bound for Multidimensional Mechanisms via
One Dimensional Distributions
We next show that, given neighbouring datasets X and Y , the tight (ε, δ)-bounds for mul-
tidimensional mechanismsM(X) andM(Y ) an be obtained by analysis of one dimensional
distributions. This equivalence is commonly used in the analysis of the differentially private
stochastic gradient descent (see e.g. [1, 3]).
Theorem D.1. Consider a function f : XN → Rd, and a randomised mechanism M(X)
of the form
M(X) = f(X) + Z, (D.1)
where Zi’s are independent random variables. Consider data sets X and Y , and denote
∆ = f(X) − f(Y ). Then, the tight (ε, δ)-bound for M(X) and M(Y ) is given by the tight
(ε, δ)-bound determined by the one dimensional random variables
‖∆‖22 +
∑
i
∆iZi and
∑
i
∆iZi.
Proof. The definition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy states that for every measurable set S ⊂ Rd:
P(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ eεP(M(Y ) ∈ S) + δ.
When M is of the form (D.1), this is clearly equivalent to the condition that for every
measurable set S ⊂ Rd:
P(∆ + Z ∈ S) ≤ eεP(Z ∈ S) + δ. (D.2)
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Let U ∈ Rd×d be a matrix with orthogonal columns such that
UT∆ =
[‖∆‖22 0 . . . 0]T = ‖∆‖22e1.
This means that U is of the form U =
[
∆ U˜
]
, where U˜ can be taken as any d × (d − 1)
matrix with columns orthogonal to ∆.
Clearly, the condition (D.2) is equivalent to the condition that for every measurable set
S ⊂ Rd:
P
(
UT(∆ + Z) ∈ UTS) ≤ eεP(UTZ ∈ UTS)+ δ. (D.3)
Furthermore, by definition of U , (D.3) is equivalent to the condition that for every measurable
set S ⊂ Rd:
P
(‖∆‖22e1 + UTZ ∈ US) ≤ eεP(UTZ ∈ US)+ δ. (D.4)
The random variables ‖∆‖22e1 +UTZ and UTZ are the same except for the first coordinate.
Moreover, since U is invertible, the condition (D.4) is equivalent to to the condition that for
every measurable set S ⊂ R:
P
(‖∆‖22e1 +∑∆iZi ∈ S) ≤ eεP(UTZ ∈ S)+ δ.
E The Subsampled Gaussian Mechanism
In this Section we give an error analysis for the approximations given in Section 6.3. Recall
first the form of the PLD for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism. For a subsampling ratio
0 < q < 1 and noise level σ > 0, the continuous PLD distribution is given by
ω(s) =
{
f(g(s))g′(s), if s > log(1− q),
0, otherwise,
(E.1)
where
f(t) =
1√
2piσ2
[qe
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q)e− t
2
2σ2 ], g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
. (E.2)
In order to carry out an error analysis for the approximations given in Section 6.3, we
define the infinite extending grid approximations of ω as follows. Let L > 0, n ∈ Z+,
∆x = 2L/n and let the grid Xn be defined as in (B.1). Define
ω∞min(s) =
∑
i∈Z c
−
i · δ(s− si), si = i∆x, c−i = ∆x ·mins∈[si,si+1] ω(s),
ω∞max(s) =
∑
i∈Z c
+
i · δ(s− si), si = i∆x, c+i = ∆x ·maxs∈[si−1,si] ω(s).
(E.3)
These discretisations lead to the following bounds.
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Lemma E.1. Let δ(ε) be given by the integral formula of Lemma A.3, i.e. it is of the form
δ(ε) = δ(∞) +
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ω(s) ds
for some privacy loss distribution ω and for some δ(∞) ≥ 0. Let δ∞min(ε) and δ∞max(ε) be
defined analogously by ω∞min and ω
∞
max. Then for all ε > 0 we have
δ∞min(ε) ≤ δ(ε) ≤ δ∞max(ε).
Proof. From the definition (E.3) and from the fact that (1 − eε−s) is a monotonously in-
creasing function of s it follows that the discrete sums δ∞min(ε) and δ
∞
max(ε) are the lower and
upper Riemann sums for the continuous integral δ(ε) on the partition {i∆x : i ∈ Z}. This
shows the claim.
Corollary E.2. Lemma E.1 directly generalises to convolutions. Consider a single composi-
tion, i.e., suppose the PLD is given by ω ∗ω for a distribution ω of the form (E.1). Let ω∞max
be defined as in (E.3) and for short, suppose it is of the form ω∞max(s) =
∑
i ai · δ(s − si).
We have that
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ω ∗ ω)(s) ds =
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)
∞∫
−∞
ω(t)ω(s− t) dt ds
=
∞∫
−∞
ω(t)
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ω(s− t) ds dt
≤
∞∫
−∞
ω(t)
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ω∞max(s− t) ds dt
=
∞∫
−∞
ω(t)
∑
si+t>ε
(1− eε−(si+t)) ai dt
≤
∞∫
−∞
ω∞max(t)
∑
si+t>ε
(1− eε−(si+t)) ai dt
=
∑
si+sj>ε
(1− eε−(si+sj)) aiaj
=
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ω∞max ∗ ω∞max)(s) ds.
(E.4)
Showing that
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ω ∗ ω)(s) ≥
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ω∞min ∗ ω∞min)(s) ds
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goes analogously. Inductively based on (E.4), we also see that
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ω ∗k ω)(s) ds ≤
∑
si1+...+sik>ε
(1− eε−(si1+...+sik )) ai1 · . . . · aik
=
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ω∞max ∗k ω∞max)(s) ds
and similarly for the lower bound determined by the convolutions of ω∞min.
We get the approximations of Section 6.3 by restricting ω∞min and ω
∞
max to the interval
[−L,L] and by running Algorithm 1 on the truncated distributions ωmin and ωmax (as defined
in equation (14) of the main text). This is equivalent to running Algorithm 1 on ω∞min and
ω∞max and the error incurred by the algorithm is given by the bounds of Theorem 10. Thus
strict lower and upper bounds are obtained by reducing the error from the result obtained
with ω∞min and adding it to the result obtained with ω
∞
max. To measure the error using
Theorem 10, we need to bound the moment generating functions of −ω∞min, ω∞min, −ω∞max and
ω∞max. We first state the following auxiliary lemma needed to bound these moment generating
functions.
Lemma E.3. For all s ≥ 1 and 0 < q ≤ 12 :
ω(s) ≤ σ
√
2
pi
e−
(σ2s+C)2
2σ2 ,
where C = σ2 log( 12q )− 12 .
Proof. When s ≥ 1,
es − (1− q) ≥ 1
2
es (E.5)
and subsequently
g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
≥ σ2s+ C˜,
where C˜ = σ2 log( 12q ) +
1
2 . We see that when 0 < q ≤ 12 , we have g(s) ≥ 12 . From (E.2) we
see that
f(g(s)) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
e−
(σ2s+C˜−1)2
2σ2 ,
Furthermore, when s ≥ 1, from (E.5) it follows that
g′(s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) ≤ 2σ
2.
Thus, when s ≥ 1,
ω(s) ≤ σ
√
2
pi
e−
(σ2s+C)2
2σ2 ,
where C = σ2 log( 12q )− 12 .
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Using Lemma E.3, we can bound the moment generating function of ω∞max as follows. We
note that E[eλωmax ] can be evaluated numerically.
Lemma E.4. Let 0 < λ ≤ L and assume σ ≥ 1 and ∆x ≤ c · L, 0 < c < 1. The moment
generating function of ω∞max can be bounded as
E[eλω
∞
max ] ≤ E[eλωmax ] + err(λ, L, σ),
where
err(λ, L, σ) = ecλL
2√
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2 erfc
(
(1− c)σ2L+ C − λ√
2σ
)
. (E.6)
Here ωmax is the restriction of ω∞max to the interval [−L,L] (i.e., as defined in equation (14)
of the main text) and the constant C is as defined in Lemma E.3.
Proof. Assuming L > |log 1− q| (i.e., ω(s) = 0 for all s < −L), the moment generating
function of ω∞max is given by
E[eλω
∞
max ] =
∫ L
−∞
eλsω∞max(s) ds+
∫ ∞
L
eλsω∞max(s) ds
=
∫ L
−L
eλsω∞max(s) ds+
∫ ∞
L
eλsω∞max(s) ds
= E[eλωmax ] +
∑
i≥n ∆x · e
λi∆x · c+i .
(E.7)
From Lemma E.3 it follows that
c+i = maxs∈[si−1,si] ω(s) ≤ σ
√
2
pi
e−
(σ2si−1+C)2
2σ2 ,
where C = σ2 log( 12q )− 12 , si = i∆x. Thus∑
i≥n e
λi∆x · c+i = eλ∆x
∑
i≥n e
λsi−1 · c+i
≤ eλ∆xσ
√
2
pi
∑
i≥n ∆x · e
λsi−1e−
(σ2si−1+C)2
2σ2
= eλ∆xσ
√
2
pi
∑
i≥n ∆x · e
−(σ2si−1+C−λ)2−λ(2C−λ)
2σ2
= eλ∆xσ
√
2
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2
∑
i≥n ∆x · e
− (σ
2si−1+C−λ)2
2σ2 .
(E.8)
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Assuming σ ≥ 1 and λ ≤ L, ∆x ≤ c · L, we further see that
eλ∆xσ
√
2
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2
∑
i≥n ∆x · e
− (σ
2si−1+C−λ)2
2σ2
≤ eλ∆xσ
√
2
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2
∫ ∞
L−∆x
e−
(σ2s+C−λ)2
2σ2 ds
≤ ecλLσ
√
2
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2
∫ ∞
(1−c)L
e−
(σ2s+C−λ)2
2σ2 ds
= ecλLσ
√
2
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2
√
2
σ
erfc
(
(1− c)σ2L+ C − λ√
2σ
)
= ecλL
2√
pi
e−
λ(2C−λ)
2σ2 erfc
(
(1− c)σ2L+ C − λ√
2σ
)
.
(E.9)
Using a reasoning similar to the proof of Lemma E.4, we get also the following bounds.
Here also, we note that E[e−λωmax ], E[eλωmin ] and E[e−λωmin ] can be evaluated numerically.
Corollary E.5. The moment generating functions of −ω∞max, ω∞min and −ω∞min can be bounded
as
E[e−λω
∞
max ] ≤ E[e−λωmax ] + err(λ, L, σ),
E[eλω
∞
min ] ≤ E[eλωmin ] + err(λ, L, σ),
E[e−λω
∞
min ] ≤ E[e−λωmin ] + err(λ, L, σ),
where err(λ, L, σ) is defined as in (E.6).
Proof. Assuming L > |log 1− q| (i.e., ω(s) = 0 for all s < −L), the moment generating
function of −ω∞max is given by
E[e−λω
∞
max ] =
∫ L
−∞
e−λsω∞max(s) ds+
∫ ∞
L
e−λsω∞max(s) ds
=
∫ L
−L
e−λsω∞max(s) ds+
∫ ∞
L
e−λsω∞max(s) ds
≤
∫ L
−L
e−λsω∞max(s) ds+
∫ ∞
L
eλsω∞max(s) ds.
(E.10)
After bounding the term
∫∞
L
eλsω∞max(s) ds as in the proof of Lemma E.4, the first claim
follows. Bounding E[eλω∞min ] and E[e−λω∞min ] can be carried out analogously to (E.10).
Remark E.6. In the experiments, the effect of the error term err(λ, L, σ) was found to be
negligible (less than 10−90 in the experiments of Figure 3).
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